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  Abstract 
 
This is a study of emotional intelligence (EI). EI was measured by 
performance and self-report tasks. Data were also obtained on basic values, 
some standard personality dimensions such as those specified in the five-factor 
model, social adjustment and several scales of impression management. 
Criteria were loneliness, work-family life balance and Internet addiction, and 
also measures of emotional and value deviance. Participants were college 
students in a business education program who participated anonymously in the 
extensive test session, which took about six hours to complete. It was found 
that EI measures - both self-report and performance - intercorrelated as 
expected, and that EI was strongly related as expected to criteria. People high 
in EI reported less loneliness, less Internet addiction and better work/studies - 
leisure/family balance. Impression management was more strongly related to 
self-report data than to performance. Self-report data were to a large extent 
accounted for by measures of personality according to the five-factor model, 
but performance measures were not. Finally, the extent of faking was 
measured and controlled for.  
 





Emotional intelligence (EI) has rapidly become a popular concept (Sjöberg, 2001a, 2001b, 
2001c), especially following successful books by Goleman (Goleman, 1995, 1998). 
Researchers and practitioners, such as Bar-On, market self-report instruments that 
purportedly measure EI (Bar-On, 2000) but little published research supports this claim. 
Claims to the effect that emotional intelligence is much more important than traditional 
intelligence have not been supported; on the contrary traditional intelligence remains a major 
dimension in the prediction of work achievement (Austin et al., 2002; Schmidt & Hunter, 
1998). This does not preclude that EI could add an important piece of information. McCrae 
argued that self-report EI has not been established as distinguished from the dimensions of 
the five-factor model (McCrae, 2000). In spite of such critical remarks, EI flourishes in the 
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test market and is probably seen as the biggest innovation of personality measurement of the 
1990's.  
 
There are obvious reasons why the introduction of EI has raised great hopes. Most people 
have probably experienced, in their own lives, the severe problems that may arise in human 
interactions of various kinds. Manipulation and deception constitute one example of the “dark 
side” of human transactions, other common problems have more to do with the sheer lack of 
understanding of how others feel and react. It is a common mistake to assume that others’ 
opinions and attitudes are more like one’s own than they, in fact, are (Baumeister, 1998). 
Managers often face grave difficulties having their roots in lack of social skills. (REF). Policy 
making in society runs into severe difficulties when people’s concerns and worries are 
overlooked. EI therefore has potential relevance both for clinical diagnosis and industrial 
selection, and also for training. But hope is one thing, actual operational measurement of the 
construct another.  
 
The original impetus for EI is found in work by Salovey, Mayer, and DiPaolo, published in 
1990 (Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990; Salovey & Mayer, 1989-1990). They suggested the 
term and devised a number of ways of measuring it, but not in a traditional self-report format, 
but in terms of performance. For example, respondents were shown photographs of faces 
intended to express various emotions. Their task was then to judge, on a set of scales, which 
emotions were expressed by each face. These judgments were then scored for the number of 
“correct” answers where assessment of correctness could be based on various approaches. 
The most common way of establishing correctness has been consensus scoring, i. e. the most 
common response is taken to define the correct response. Another way is to use expert 
judgments to define the correct response. A variation of that approach is used in the present 
study, and compared to consensus scoring. 
 
The scale devised by Salovey and colleagues (Salovey, Mayer, Caruso, & Lopez, in press), 
called MSCEIT, has been criticized for low reliability (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998) 
but it has later been revised and now is claimed to have satisfactory reliability (Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). Validation of the theory of emotional intelligence has 
so far been reported by relatively few authors, see the book by Matthews, Zeidner and 
Roberts for a review (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). A number of different 
approaches were also reviewed in a handbook on emotional intelligence (Bar-On & Parker, 
2000). The correlates of emotional intelligence should occur both in social dimensions, such 
as empathy (Schutte et al., 1998) and aspects of emotion proper, such as affective intensity 
(Engelberg, 2001). We also expect that values are related to EI. Our previous results suggest 
that people high in EI are less materialistic than others (Engelberg, 2001; Sjöberg, 2001a) and 
less inclined towards adopting a cynical and manipulative attitude (Sjöberg, 2001c).  
 
Some of the postulated correlates of EI may be regarded as facets of the concept per se. We 
mention alexithymia (negative), empathy (positive), self actualization (positive) and 
Machiavellianism (negative). Alexithymia is a clinical term denoting lack of ability to name 
and identify emotions (Taylor, 2000; Weinryb, Gustavsson, Åsberg, & Rössel, 1992). EI is, 
on the other hand, intended as a dimension of relevance for understanding variation in non-
clinical populations. Notwithstanding, alexithymia is of interest in a validation study of EI 
measures. Empathy (Hogan, 1969; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1970) has long been of interest in 
social psychology and should clearly be related to EI, as far as EI can be considered to  
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measure social intelligence as well as emotional processes in the more proper sense of the 
word. Social intelligence has been notoriously hard to measure (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000) 
but current interest in EI may contribute to a long overdue revival of this field. Self-
actualization is a central construct in humanistic psychology  (Jones & Crandall, 1986; 
Maslow, 1954) and relates in a straightforward manner to the core of the concept of EI. 
Machiavellianism, reflecting a cynical and manipulative attitude to one’s fellow human 
beings, may be a way to pursue one’s interests but is self-defeating, sooner or later, and 
contrary to what EI stands for (Bar-On & Parker, 2000).  
 
It is likely that the implications of EI of most interest are social in nature (Schutte et al., 
2001). In industrial psychology, EI is being used both for selection and training, presumably 
because of such social implications. People high in EI are expected to perform better in any 
job having social demands, and almost all jobs do, more or less, see e.g. Slaski and 
Cartwright (Slaski & Cartwright, 2002). People who adjust well to the social environment, at 
work or at home, are also expected to function better in their professional roles (Carlson, 
Kacmar, & Williams, 2000). In the present study, we included measures of social adjustment 
as criteria for the EI measures used. The dimensions we measure are loneliness, life balance 
between work and leisure/family and Internet addiction. To measure loneliness, the UCLA 
loneliness scale (Russell, 1996) was used. The Internet addiction scale (Young, 1998; Young & 
Rogers, 1998) was also employed, as well as a work-family balance scale (Sjöberg, 2001a), 
as described in more detail in a later section.  
 
Social and emotional competence and adjustment are concepts, which are related in intricate 
and subtle manners. A person who reacts emotionally in a different way than most others is 
likely to run into social problems, sooner or later. Also, a person who reacts differently from 
what others expect people to do is in a potential social problem situation. He or she would be 
less predictable than others, which could be socially risky. We develop and apply measures of 
emotional deviance and unpredictability in the present study. 
 
Values are often believed to be an important source of variation among individuals, yet that 
assertion has been hard to support (Sjöberg, 1998). As mentioned above, however, we have 
found a negative relationship between materialistic values (stressing monetary achievement 
in life) and EI. In the present study, we wanted to explore the issue further by means of using 
the broad value scale constructed and extensively used by Schwartz (Schwartz, 1992), with 
the aim of relating Schwartz dimensions to EI scores. In addition, having idiosyncratic values 
may carry with it a social risk, and would hence be indicative of less successful social 
adjustment. Value deviance was measured by relating each individual’s value to the 
corresponding mean in the group.  
 
The Five-Factor model of personality (McCrae & Costa, 1987) enjoys widespread credibility 
at the present time. It is important to investigate if new concepts, such as EI, really contribute 
anything beyond the established five factors of agreeableness, extraversion, emotional 
stability, intellectual openness and conscientiousness. If EI has the wider social connotations 
frequently claimed for it, it should be related to agreeableness which is a personality facet 
loaded on social skill and adjustment. A discriminating EI scale should, however, not be 
correlated with the other four personality dimensions. In addition, EI measures should be 
uncorrelated with impression management tendencies of the test-takers. Impression 
management is ever present in all important assessment situations, and possibly even in  
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situations where there are no clear consequences to the test-takers of the test results.  
 
Summing up, the purposes of the present study was to answer the following questions: 
   
- Do self-report and performance measures converge on a common dimension of EI? 
- Do EI measures correlate with other, conceptually related, dimensions such as alexithymia? 
- What are the wider implications of EI in terms of life adjustment of EI? 
- Is there a relationship between idiosyncrasies of emotional reactions and values and EI? 
- Is there a relationship between basic values and EI? 
- Does EI, measured as self-report or performance, measure anything beyond the basic 
dimensions of the five-factor model? 
- What are the effects of impression management on EI measures? Can they be controlled for 
statistically? 
 
As a general strategy, we have devised tasks of our own for measuring performance. These 
are not part of an established test such as MSCEIT but should measure the same EI concept, 
if indeed such a concept has empirical substance. The self-report scale due to Schutte et al. 
(Schutte et al., 1998) was used to measure self-report EI. This is probably the best-known 
self-report scale available in the scientific literature. Bar-On’s more extensive self-report EI 
test seems not to be available for research purposes without extensive fees, which our budget 
did not allow for.  
 
As an additional purpose, we also intended to study in detail the problems of deception and 
faking. Our basic interest in this respect was to study to what extent the variables were 
sensitive to faking in a high-stakes, real testing situation. We also wished to investigate how 
well we could correct for such tactical behavior by means of a new way of measuring faking 
developed here, and then used for statistical control of faking. The validity of the procedure is 
investigated by comparing a group tested anonymously with one tested under high-stakes 






Participants and test situations  
 
Forty-one participants were recruited among students at the Stockholm School of Economics. 
They were on the average 21.1 years old (range 18-28) and 19 were women, 21 men. One 
participant did not state gender. All testing was anonymous, a fact stressed to the subjects. 
Testing was done in one session, with all participants present at the same time. The test-
takers were paid SEK 400 for participation (at that time about US $ 40).  
 
One hundred and ninety participants had taken the same tests (with some exceptions) about 
11 months before, as part of a process for assessing applicants to the Stockholm School of 
Economics. They had been invited to take part in the test, on the basis of, mainly, high school 
grades or a test of intellectual ability. Since admission to the School is highly competitive and 
very desirable for many of these applicants, it was expected that they did what they could to 
be admitted. Even if instructions stressed that they should give honest and frank answers to  
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self-report items, it was not really expected that they would be entirely open and frank. Of 
course, it was expected that there would be variability in the extent of impression 
management, and much care went into measuring that dimension, as explained in a 
subsequent section.  
 
The group of 190 applicants consisted of 102 men and 88 women, average age 20.5 years 
(range 18-34). They were comparable to those who had been admitted to the school, only 
slightly lower in grades or results on tests of intellectual ability. The latter circumstance 
caused no concern about lack of comparability because the kinds of test studied do not 




The participants went through the various tasks in the following order: 
 
- Mood ratings 
- Identifying emotions in facial expressions 
- UCLA Loneliness scale 
- Work-family balance scale 
- Identifying emotions in social episodes 
- Internet addiction scale  
- Schwartz’s value scale 
- Main personality questionnaire 
 
The instructions emphasized the importance of frank and honest answers. In the end of the 
main personality questionnaires, some items were given under the instruction to give faked 
answers that would be likely to contribute to a positive admission decision regarding the test-
taker. The design of these items is explained in a subsequent section. The total test battery 
took about 6 hours of testing time, i.e. a full day of testing. Details follow in the next section. 
 
  Results 
 
Preliminaries: Test and index development 
 
The tests described here were designed and selected so as to measure EI and some related 
dimensions. Not all can be counted as EI dimensions proper, but they were of both practical 
and theoretical interest in the present context and they provided a context for the attempt to 
isolate the EI dimension.  
 
Measurement of emotional intelligence and related concepts. Some items had been translated 
from the literature, among them the EI scale proposed by Schutte et al. (Schutte et al., 1998). 
Reliabilities were estimated by means of Cronbach's alpha 
 (Cronbach, 1951). The Schutte et al. scale (present alpha=0.89
2) measures alexithymia 
                                                 
 
2. Present alpha values are based on the testing of the anonymous test-takers as reported in the 
present article, in many cases using translated scales. The corresponding values in the larger, high-
stakes, group are available in a separate publication (Sjöberg, 2001b), and were quite similar to the 
values reported here. Small SD's may account for some of the fairly low reliability coefficients noted  
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(ability to identify and describe feelings, as well as a tendency to shun away from emotional 
dimensions in thought and social relations), attention to feelings, clarity of feelings, mood 
repair, optimism and impulse control. The alexithymia scale of Bagby, Parker & Taylor 
(Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) was also employed (present alpha=0.81). The empathy 
(Hogan, 1969) scale of Mehrabian and Epstein (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1970) was used 
(present alpha=0.75), as well as the Jones and Crandall scale of self-actualisation (Jones & 
Crandall, 1986) (present alpha=0.68). Nineteen of the items of the Christie scale of 
Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970), and 11 additional items written for the present 
study, were used (present alpha including the new items=0.82). 
 
Performance measures of EI. We used a performance dimension measuring knowledge about 
other people's current and habitual mood, here termed emotion knowledge. This is a measure 
not included in the MSCEIT scale devised by Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (Mayer, Salovey, 
& Caruso, 2000) who studied other aspects of knowledge about emotions. To measure it, we 
used a mood scale consisting of 71 items, measuring six factors (Sjöberg, Svensson, & 
Persson, 1979). The six factors were happiness, tension, fatigue, confidence, extraversion and 
social orientation. The participants were instructed to rate their own current mood at the start 
of the test session, and then their habitual mood. After that, they were asked to rate the 
current and habitual mood of the other test-takers. The mean ratings of current and habitual 
mood were used as criteria. Factor scores were computed and the absolute differences 
between actual means of current and habitual mood on the one hand, beliefs about these 
dimensions on the other, were computed for each participant and each factor. The alphas 
(computed across the six factors) were 0.59 and 0.84 for current and habitual mood, 
respectively. This is a type of “expert scoring” since the true values were estimated and used 
as criteria (means of mood ratings). Consensus scoring was also carried out, using the mean 
guessed values as criteria. The alphas for current and habitual mood in this case were 0.63 
and 0.78, respectively. Intercorrelations of the four scores are given in Table 1.  
                                                                                                                                                        
here. It should also be noted that a four-category response scale (see text) was used throughout, which 
in some cases was a divergence from the procedures of the original scales.  
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Table 1. Correlations among measures of emotional knowledge (mood scores).  












1.00 0.46**  0.16 0.23 
Consensus, habitual 
mood 
0.46**  1.00 0.29 0.44** 
 “Expert” criterion, 
current mood 
0.16 0.29 1.00 0.46** 
 “Expert” criterion, 
habitual mood 
0.23  0.44** 0.46** 1.00 
 
For further analyses, the four mood scores were combined to two measures: consensus and 
“expert”. Mood rating data were also used for scoring deviant emotional reactions, see a 
following subsection. 
 
In a second phase of the test session, participants made ratings of social interaction episodes 
described in the questionnaire, and of facial expressions
3. These tasks were designed to 
measure ability to identify emotions, this being the major aspect of EI according to Ciarrochi 
et al. (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000), and also the easiest ones to measure. The "correct" 
answer in each case was the most common one given in the present group. In a few cases two 
response alternatives were equally often chosen, and most popular, and then they were both 
used as definitions of correctness.  
 
 In the first part of the section on emotion identification, 12 pictures from the Lightfoot series 
of facial expressions (Engen, Levy, & Schlosberg, 1957) were displayed, and the participants 











Ten social episodes, each involving two key actors, were then described. The participants 
were asked to rate, on unipolar three category scales, to what extent each of the two actors 
felt, at the conclusion of the episode: 
 
                                                 














The alpha values were, for episodes and facial expressions, 0.85 and 0.77, respectively.  
 
Intercorrelations among the EI performance scores and the Schutte et al. self-report scale are 
given in Table 2. 
 















al. EI scale 
Facial expressions  1.00 0.78**  -0.19  -0.32*  0.28 
Social episodes  0.78** 1.00  -0.28  -0.35* 0.23 
Emotional knowledge 
consensus criterion 
-0.19 -0.28 1.00  0.86**  0.18 
Emotional knowledge 
“expert” criterion 
-0.32* -0.35* 0.86** 1.00  0.10 
Schutte et al. EI scale  0.28 0.23 0.18 0.10 1.00 
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The table shows that there was a very high correlation between the two measures based on 
performance (facial expressions and social episodes), and also convergence with the mood 
measures
4, although weaker. The Schutte scale did correlate with the performance measures 
in the expected direction, but not significantly at the 0.05 level. Lack of convergence is 
therefore noted mostly with the self-report scale
5. It is also interesting to note that the 
consensus scoring of emotional knowledge resulted in a measure with less convergent 
validity than the scoring based on actual means, here called “expert” scoring. Consensus and 
“expert” scoring of mood correlated very strongly
6.  
 
Emotional idiosyncrasies. Emotional idiosyncrasies were measured with mood rating data as 
a basis. The scores of the six basic dimensions (see above) were related to means of all 
subjects, current and habitual mood. The absolute values of the deviations from the means 
were computed and averaged across the six dimensions to get a measure of deviant mood. 
The procedure was repeated for habitual mood. The reliabilities of these two scores were 0.59 
and 0.84, respectively.  
 
An analogous scoring was performed with the use of mean guessed moods rather than actual 
moods. In that way, we measured to what extent the subjects’ reported actual and habitual 
moods conformed to the moods expected by the group of subjects. It can be noted that this is 
a dimension different from deviant moods per se. The reliabilities for current and habitual 
mood, using this type of scoring, were 0.53 and 0.70, respectively. Intercorrelations among 
the four measures of emotional idiosyncrasies are given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Intercorrelations of measures of deviant and unpredictable mood.  










1.00 0.46**  0.88**  0.41** 
Deviant mood, 
habitual 
0.46** 1.00  0.40*  0.93** 
Unpredictable 
mood, current 
0.88** 0.40*  1.00  0.39* 
Unpredictable 
mood, habitual 
0.41** 0.93** 0.39*  1.00 
 
The scores for deviant moods and unpredictable moods were strongly correlated, as might 
                                                 
 
4. Note that the scores on emotion knowledge are inverse measures of performance: the larger 
the deviations, the worse the performance.  
 
5. In the larger, high-stakes group the pattern of correlations among EI measures was similar, 
but episodes and facial expressions correlated somewhat weaker, r = 0.44, and emotion knowledge 
had a clearer, relationship to the Schutte et al. scale, see Sjöberg (Sjöberg, 2001b).   
 
6. The larger, high-stakes, group was only scored for the “expert” criterion.  
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have been expected. For further analysis we computed one combined index for deviant 
moods, current and habitual mood combined, and one for unpredictable mood.  
 
Psychometric properties of other scales of social adjustment and personality. Several other 
scales were used; reliabilities will be reported here. To measure loneliness, the UCLA 
loneliness scale (Russell, 1996) was used.  Its alpha value here was 0.85, 21 items. The work-
family balance scale (Sjöberg, 2001a) returned an alpha value of 0.90 with 20 items. The 
Internet addiction scale (Young, 1998; Young & Rogers, 1998) was used. Seven items had to 
be deleted because they gave no variation among test-takers; the scale still had a very good 
alpha value of 0.95. A Big Five questionnaire (Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997) was also used, 
having 14-20 balanced items in each factor
7.  The alpha values were between 0.73 and 0.83. 
 
The three scales of social adjustment formed a reasonably tight cluster. Loneliness correlated 
-0.39 with balance and 0.33 with Internet addiction, respectively. Balance and Internet 
addiction correlation -0.45. All these correlations were statistically significant at least at the 
0.05 level.  
 
Values. The Schwartz value scale contains 56 items. There was only one item explicitly 
concerned with materialism, an item measuring the value of being very wealthy, and that 
aspect will therefore not be further covered here
8. The factor structure of the scale seemed 
somewhat unstable in our previous work; we therefore decided to perform a component 
analysis on these items in spite of the small sample. Four components appeared, and were 
measures as follows: 
 
- Freedom and achievement (15 items, alpha = 0.84) 
- Tradition, hierarchy (6 items, alpha = 0.74) 
- Equality, justice (10 items, alpha = 0.82) 
- Stimulation, excitement (8 items, alpha = 0.72) 
 
Indices measuring these values were computed. We also calculated the absolute deviations 
from the means in these value dimensions, and formed an index of value deviance by taking 
their average. 
 
Response styles. To measure response style and self-presentation bias, the Crowne-Marlowe 
measure of social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was employed (present 
alpha=0.84). More recently developed scales by Paulhus (Paulhus, Bruce, & Trapnell, 1995; 
Paulhus & Reid, 1991) were also included, intended to measure impression management (19 
items, alpha=0.77) and self deception (19 items, alpha=0.54). Both impression management 
and self-deception were treated here as response style variables. The three response styles 
scales were strongly intercorrelated, see Table 4. 
          
                                                 
 
7. Due to a technical mishap one item was missed and one was deleted for other reasons. The 
response scale used four categories, not five as in the standard version. A few items were slightly 
rephrased. 
 
8. Analyses made on that single item gave no clear results.  
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Table 4. Intercorrelations of the impression management and self-deception scales.  










1.00 0.72**  0.49** 
Paulhus impression 
management scale 
0.72** 1.00  0.30 
Paulhus self 
deception scale 
0.49** 0.30  1.00 
  
Critics of the social desirability and impression management scales argue that these may well 
measure some real factor such as adjustment (McCrae & Costa, 1983; Robinson, 1973). 
However, in our view, the items do measure a not very sophisticated tendency in impression 
management; it is unlikely that those who endorse such items tell the truth because people 
simply are not that well adjusted. Or they may in fact see themselves in such a light and that 
would not seem to be a sign of good adjustment but the opposite. It is interesting to note that 
the Self Deception subscale was somewhat distinguished from the two impression 
management scales. It should also be noted that the high alpha values obtained here were in 
spite of instructions that all test results were to be wholly anonymous
9.  
 
A different approach to measuring faking tendencies was also employed, suggested in an 
earlier paper (Sjöberg, 2001b). The difference scores between faking and non-faking were 
computed for the four scales impulsivity, manifest anxiety, sensation seeking and self-esteem. 
These were the scales for which instruction had been given to fake the responses in the last 
part of the questionnaire. Intercorrelations among the difference scores are given in Table 10. 
Two of the scores were reversed
10.  
   
                                                 
 
9. Some respondents may not have believed that, we noted for example above that one did not 
even state her gender (we know she was a woman, since only one respondent behaved this way). It is 
also possible that even anonymous responses are somehow regarded as an exposure of one’s 
personality to some “unknown other” and that tactics of response may therefore have been evoked.  
 
10. The amount of faking should be an inverse function of the difference between faked and 
non-faked responses: the closer they are, the more faking also under instructions to answer honestly. 
However, the directions of scoring needed to be adjusted because two variables were regarded as 
positive (self esteem and sensation seeking) and two as negative (manifest anxiety and impulsivity).   
12 
 
Table 5. Intercorrelations of faking scores. 







Self esteem  1.00 0.32**  0.35**  0.43** 
Sensation 
seeking 
0.32** 1.00  0.25** 0.21** 
Impulsivity 
(reversed) 




0.43** 0.21** 0.37** 1.00 
 
The differences were combined to form a measure of faking with the rationale that a small 
difference between a value under explicit instructions to fake, and one under instructions to 
give truthful answers, implies a high level of faking in the “truthful” answers.  
 
 
EI and related constructs 
 
Table 6 shows the correlations between EI measures and scales intended to measure facets of 
emotional intelligence, i.e. alexithymia, empathy, self-actualization and Machiavellianism, 
values and idiosyncratic emotional and value reactions.  
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Table 6. Intercorrelations of EI scales, facets of emotional intelligence, values, and 
idiosyncratic emotional and value reactions.  
  Facial 
expressions 









al.’s EQ scale 
Alexithymia  -0.32*  -0.14 -0.03 -0.08 -0.64** 
Self  Actualization  0.40* 0.33* 0.17  0.16  0.56** 
Machiavellianism -0.17  -0.19 -0.23 -0.21 -0.41** 
Empathy 0.20 0.22 0.02 0.10 0.45** 
Freedom, 
achievement   0.48** 0.40** -0.02  -0.11  0.32* 
Tradition, hierarchy  -0.16  -0.11 -0.14 -0.03 -0.03 
Equality,  justice  0.26  0.33* -0.08 -0.08 0.27 
Stimulation, 
excitement  0.20  -0.04 -0.11 -0.13 -0.02 
Mood  deviance  -0.51** -0.58** 0.39*  0.36*  -0.29 
Mood 
unpredictability  -0.42** -0.48** 0.40**  0.30  -0.10 
Value  deviance  -0.35* -0.33* 0.13  0.04  -0.22 
 
It is notable that the self-report measure had stronger correlations with the four facet scales 
than performance measures. On the other hand, the performance measures had strong 
correlations with deviant and unpredictable moods, and with value deviance. There were also 
some significant correlations between performance measures and self-actualization and 
alexithymia. The latter was to be expected, due to the difficulties of alexithymics to label 
emotions (Pandey, 1997).  
 
With regard to values, it was interesting to note that two of the value dimensions showed a 
relationship to EI: equality and justice, and freedom and achievement. The two dimensions 
having no relationship to EI were Hierarchy and Excitement. This result can be related to the 
finding here, and in our previous work, that EI is negatively related to Machiavellianism. 
Machiavellianism was strongly and negatively related in the present data to the value 
dimension Equality and Justice; r  =  -0.46. Correlations between EI and social adjustment 




Table 7. Intercorrelations of EI scales, idiosyncratic emotional reactions, and 



































Balance work-family  0.48** 0.42** -0.21  -0.23  0.35* -0.44**  -0.32* -0.24 
UCLA loneliness scale  -0.32* -0.28  -0.02  -0.08  -
0.55**  0.24 0.02 0.28 
Internet addiction scale  -0.44** -0.38*  0.04  0.04  -0.16  0.17 0.11 0.65** 
 
Social adjustment was consistently and strongly related to emotional intelligence, especially 
the performance measures. Social adjustment has previously been related to the perception of 
facial emotions (Niedenthal, Brauer, Robin, & Innes-Ker, 2002). It was also interesting that 
idiosyncrasies of emotional reactions, and of values, were negatively related to some aspects 
of social adjustment. The Schutte et al. scale also performed reasonably well, while measures 
of emotional knowledge were unrelated to social adjustment. 
 
Impression management and faking 
 
It has been found that the performance measures correlated somewhat higher with the criteria 
than the Schutte et al. scale, with the exception of the mood scales. However, this could be 
due to a common factor of impression management. The multiple correlations between EI 
measurers and the three impression management scales are given in Table 8.  
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Table 8. Multiple correlations between EI variables and impression 




EI variable  High-stakes group  Anonymous group 
Facial expressions  0.000  0.078 
Social episodes  0.000  0.044 
Emotional knowledge 
“expert” scoring  0.005 0.000 
Schutte et al.  0.312  0.211 
 
 
The expected pattern occurred. Only the self-report scale was sensitive to impression 
management and faking. The results suggest that self-deception/impression management may 
have been the cause of some of the correlations between the Schutte scale and other scales. 
The partial correlations, controlling for the three response style scales, were, however, 
essentially unchanged. 
 
A final analysis was to check if the EI measures were merely a new way of expressing the 
variance accounted for by the Five-Factor Model. Simple and multiple correlations were 
computed between each of the four EI measures and the five factor scores (extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and intellectual openness), see Table 9 




















Agreeableness  0.43** 0.42** 0.12  -0.01  0.32* 
Conscientious-
ness 
0.15 0.28 -0.03  -0.05  0.33* 
Emotional 
stability 
0.21 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.53** 
Intellectual 
openness 
0.13 0.06 0.32*  0.17 0.59** 
Extraversion-
introversion 
-0.08 -0.02 -0.29 -0.22 -0.70** 
R
2
adj  0.088 0.119 0.028 0.159 0.551 
 
 
It is thus seen that the self-report measure, while functioning well according to several criteria 
used here, is largely a replication of Five-Factor standard personality variance. At the same 
time, the performance measures were little related to four of the five factors in the five-factor 
model, somewhat unexpected with regard to recent work on the ability to recognize emotions 
in facial expressions (Matsumoto et al., 2000).  
 
Gender differences should be mentioned, since they usually favor the females when it comes 
to EI. This was true also in the present study (except for emotion knowledge) but the 
differences were small and not significant.  
 
Special analysis of faking in high-stakes testing 
  
Did the respondents of the testing sessions, which had real consequences (called Real Testing 
in the following) differ from those who tested anonymously? We first investigate the four 




Table 10. Response bias scores in two groups, all measures standardized to mean=0 
and SD=1 in the combined group.  






t df  p 
Crowne-Marlowe social 
desirability 
0.20 -0.93  7.29  229  <0.0005 
Paulhus Impression 
Management 
0.15 -0.70  5.23  229  <0.0005 
Paulhus Self deception  0.15 -0.68  5.04  229  <0.0005 
Combined faking score 
based on instructions to 
fake 
-0.29 1.32  11.83  229  <0.0005 
 
These results are encouraging because they show that the response bias variables all worked 
as expected. Note that the last variable, the faking score, should be related in the opposite 
direction from the other three scores. It was, in fact, the most sensitive one, but they were all 
very sensitive, giving very large differences indeed.  
 
The next question is to what extent the various EI measures and other variables were affected 
by tactical answering; see Table 11 for performance measures and Table 12 for self-report 
measures. Table 12 also contains the results of adjusting the differences for impression 
management and faking.  
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Table 11. Test scores in two groups, all measures standardized to mean=0 and SD=1 
in the combined group. Performance scales.  







t  df  p 
Facial expressions  -0.01 0.04  ns     
Social episodes  -0.19  0.87 6.69 227  <0.0005 
Emotional knowledge “expert” scoring  -0.02 0.11  ns     
 
 
Table 12. Test scores in two groups, all measures standardized to mean=0 and SD=1 
in the combined group. Self report scales. 
















Schutte et al. EQ  0.16  -0.73  5.43  229  <0.0005  0.02  ns 
Alexithymia  -0.17  0.80 6.09 229  <0.0005  0.07 ns 
Self  actualization  0.18 -0.82  6.32 229  <0.0005  -0.05  ns 
Machiavellianism  -0.14  0.67 4.96 229  <0.0005  0.12 ns 
Empathy  0.00  -0.02    ns  0.07  ns 
Big  5:  Agreeableness  0.13 -0.62  4.55 229  <0.0005  -0.17  ns 
Big 5: Emotional stability  0.19  -0.86  6.65  229  <0.0005  -0.03  ns 
Big 5: Extraversion-
introversion 
0.15 -0.71  5.30 229  <0.0005  0.13 ns 
Big 5: Intellectual openness  0.21  -0.99  7.90  229  <0.0005  -0.18  ns 
Big 5: Conscientiousness  0.18  -0.82  6.24  229  <0.0005  -0.47  2.78** 
Note 1. Difference between mean residuals when the four impression managements and faking variables have 
been controlled for by linear regressions.  
 
Note first, in Table 11, that the test-takers in the high-stakes situation did not differ 
significantly from the anonymous subjects in 2 of the 3 performance measures. In the third, 
social episodes, they did significantly worse than the anonymous test-takers
11. Hence, there is 
no indication in these data that the performance measures were being faked.  
                                                 
 
11. The two tests were not wholly comparable in this dimension, because 20 episodes were 
used in the high-stakes situation, only 10 of them in the anonymous condition. The scores were based 
on the same subset of 10 episodes in both cases, however. The reason for the anomalous result that 
test-takers in the real testing situation did worse may be that they answered in a more speculative 
manner, in a search for “smart solutions” to the test questions.   
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Turning now to Table 12, the picture is very different. The results suggest that the 
respondents in the high-stakes situation faked a positive image of themselves, because the 
comparable group, which worked under anonymity, gave a much less rosy picture of 
themselves. All these differences, with the exception of Empathy, are truly very large. This is 
a result, which agrees well with the fact that the two groups also differed - even more strongly 
- on measures of impression management, faking and self-deception
12.  
 
In all cases, with one exception, statistical control for impression management and faking 
removed virtual all of the difference between the two groups. In other words, statistical 
control was sufficiently strong to remove the motivational effects of the high-stakes testing 
situation. The remaining case where this was not true was the measure of conscientiousness. 
However, even in that case about half of the effect of the high-stakes situation as compared to 
the anonymous situation was removed. The reason for the relative failure of this particular 
variable, as distinguished from all others tested for the influence of impression management, 
may be related to the fact that the measure of faking did not have any effect on it, contrary to 
the large effects found on other variables. The faking measure is relatively specific and would 










The main findings of the study were: 
 
 
!  Even if the participants  were all young and intellectually select students they varied 
considerably in EI and related constructs. The concepts were hence found to be relevant 
and applicable in a non-clinical setting, in spite of the clinical roots of some of the 
facets of EI, such as alexithymia. 
 
!  Support was obtained for the notion that EI is positively related to social adjustment in 
the group studied. This was true of adjustment in a very direct sense, such as loneliness, 
but also of indirect measures such as deviant values or deviant emotional responses.  
 
!  Of the two approaches to measuring EI, performance scales showed considerably more 
promise in several ways. The two most important performance measures showed strong 
convergence. They were unaffected by tactics of responding in a high-stakes selection 
context, while self-report scales, as expected, were found to be excessively distorted by 
such tactics.  
 
                                                 
 
12. In passing, we note that self-deception also seems to be actively faked, like almost all other 
self-report measures in the present study.   
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!  Faking was investigated and found to be abundant in the high-stakes selection context. 
However, extensive coverage of impression management and faking tendencies and 
separate measurement of such tendencies made it possible to exert statistical control 
over faking and remove virtually all of its effects.  
 
Turning now to details, several measurement problems were addressed in the present study. 
The results support the notions that EI can be measured either by self-report or performance 
scales, and that these two approaches tend to give similar information. However, the self-
report data were heavily contaminated by regular Five-Factor Model variance, which was not 
true of the performance measures. The correlation between one of the five factors and EI 
performance was restricted to Agreeableness, and it is reasonable that EI should be correlated 
with that factor, since EI contains social intelligence as one of its aspects. In addition, 
impression management and self-deception were more strongly related to the self-report 
measure than two the performance measures. 
 
Another measurement problem is the scoring of performance measures. Both facial 
expressions and episodes were scored by means of consensus based scoring keys. For 
emotional knowledge we had access both to consensus and “expert” scoring, and the latter 
worked better. Possibly, episodes and facial expressions may be scored according to expert 
judgment in future work, but just who is an expert is not obvious. Differences among experts 
might be a problem as well. We also note that consensus scoring could be expected to 
approximate expert scoring since the mean judgments of a group tend to be close to expert 
assessment in many circumstances. 
 
The present study is admittedly based on a small sample only, but we suggest that the results 
are quite strong. The debate on how to measure EI goes on, and we believe that results such 
as the present ones speak strongly in favor of performance measures. They were less affected 
by response styles and tactical answers, and also less correlated with the standard Big 5 
dimensions of personality. This does not preclude that even self-report EI scales may measure 
variance beyond the Big 5, just that performance measures are much better in that respect. 
 
The lack of agreement between self-report measures and performance measures of EI and 
facets of EI is somewhat disturbing, in spite of partial overlap. However, self-report measures 
were contaminated by response styles and reflected mostly the basic five-factor model 
dimensions of personality; hence they were probably coarse measures of EI even in the 
anonymous group. The findings on faking and relative lack of unique variance beyond the 
FFM speak clearly against using self-report measures as criterion measures of EI.  
 
People who are high in EI will, according to the present results, be better adjusted socially - 
less lonely and less likely to develop Internet addiction, see also Engelberg and Sjöberg 
(Engelberg & Sjöberg, in press-c). They will also live a more balanced life and have a rich 
family life or leisure in addition to work and studies. The pattern of results 
that emerged in the present study thus supports the notion that social competence 
characteristic of high EI confers some actual advantage for adjustment. In line with these 
results, Furnham and Petrides reported recently a strong relationship between EI and 
happiness (Furnham & Petrides, 2003).  
 
The pervasive use of consensus scoring in studies on EI actually presumes, as pointed out by  
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Roberts and colleagues (Roberts & Matthews, 2001), that a match between responses of an 
individual and the group as a whole indicates a better adaptation to the social environment. It 
is interesting to note that one of the few strong and replicable findings in Rorschach research 
concerns "good form", i.e. conventional answers. People who give many conventional 
answers tend to be better adjusted (Dawes, 1999). This type of finding not only provides some 
additional support for the consensus scoring of EI performance measures, it provides some 
input to the conceptual underpinnings of EI as a construct to encompass the ability for 
adaptation (Izard, 2001). It nevertheless remains unclear whether such ability stems from 
differences in cognitive intelligence, learned skills for processing information, or socio-
cultural factors, see Zeidner, Matthews and Roberts (Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001).  
 
Deviance and unpredictability of emotional reactions were found to be negatively related to 
performance measures, as well as to social adjustment when measured in terms of work-
family balance. Mood conformity thus seems to be related to social adjustment and this result 
is in some accordance with the proposal by Mayer and colleagues (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2001) to include emotion management as part of emotional competence. It would 
however be more proper to consider such ability in terms of social competence or intelligence. 
The gathering of information about the mood prevailing in social contexts to adjust one's 
emotions accordingly is not an end in itself, but a means to adjust socially. In addition to the 
above-mentioned correlation between performance measures and the Agreeableness factor of 
the Big Five, these results may suggest that EI is ultimately about social adjustment. 
 
The findings on value in the present study agree with our previous work (Engelberg & 
Sjöberg, 2003). High EI is associated with stressing such values as freedom and also 
achievement. Value deviance was found to be a positive indicator of Internet addiction; 
possibly further strengthening the argument that social intelligence is at the core of EI to 
facilitate adjustment to the social environment (Engelberg & Sjöberg, in press-a, in press-b). 
Value deviance has been found to be associated with low social adjustment  (Schacter et al., 
1954) and in recent work low EI in adolescents was found to be associated with adjustment 
difficulties beyond what could be predicted on the basis of traditional personality factors 
(Petrides, Frederickson, & Furnham, 2004). Further work on materialistic values in addition 
to the ones covered by the Schwartz scale would be interesting, as would work on 
environmental values.  
 
The high correlation between value idiosyncrasies and Internet addiction calls for further 
research. Does surfing on the net bring in new value perspectives, or is surfing resorted to in 
the face of the social failures caused by individualistic thinking? It would be interesting to 
know also what purposes are fulfilled by surfing, since it can be socially dysfunctional (e.g. 
involving pornographic sites) or, in a way, functional and maybe work as a substitute, e.g. 
various forms of “chatting”.  
 
The practical measurement of EI, or indeed most personality dimensions, is particularly 
difficult when respondents are highly motivated to achieve a good result. This is certainly the 
case with the tests we have used in the admission procedure to the Stockholm School of 
Economics. The results obtained when comparing an anonymous group with a group tested 
under in a real high-stakes situation showed very large differences and very clear evidence of 
tactical responding. This may, however, not be as disastrous as it looks at first sight, provided  
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efficient statistical control is applied
13. Faking and tactical answering was measured with four 
separate dimensions, one of them based on differences between explicitly faked and other 
responses. This is a type of measure, which showed much promise and could be further 
developed. The statistical control for tactical responses, which was made possible by our 
design, was very successful. Self-report scales might therefore be quite useful even in a 
situation where the test-takers are very highly motivated and give many tactical responses. 
This is, of course, under the assumption that they are not all equally tactical, but that seems to 
be a mild assumption. People always differ. Yet, many practitioners would probably prefer to 
avoid the psychometric niceties of measuring tactical behavior and go for performance 
measures which probably cannot be faked, no matter how much one tries. It is like faking 
intelligence. You cannot do it, or if you can, you are not faking
14. Faking can have many and 
subtle effects on the construct validity of scores (Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & 
Drasgow, 2001).  
                            
We note that much research on personality and adjustment uses self-report scales to measure 
all dimensions. The occurrence of relationships may then be due to common response style 
variance, or can be explained by underlying Big 5 common variance. The present results with 
the performance measures cannot be due to such artefacts.    
  
                                                 
 
13. Previous experience with such control, using 3 och the 4 measures applied here, has shown 
that enormous differences may result in individual cases. This is in spite of a relatively high rank order 
correlation between raw and adjusted test results (Sjöberg, 2001b). The argument that impression 
management does not decrease test validity may be true, but the need for adjustment is still quite 
strong, not least on ethical grounds. 
 
14. This reasoning disregards the security problems of testing which arise with the use of 
standard commercial tests. It is the experience of one of us (LS), on the basis of more than 10 years of 
experience in testing applicants to the SSE, that many people are quite creative when it comes to 
figuring out details about the tests being used, and “right” answers. That was a reason for customizing 
tests to this special group. In addition, popular commercial tests such as the Myers-Briggs have little 
speaking in favor of them in selection work and usually no validation research at all under Swedish 
circumstances (Sjöberg, 2000, 2001d).   
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